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2Barbara Bennett*
Bankregulators andotheranalysts worry thatthe recent rapidgrowth
in standby letters ofcredit (SLCs) outstanding is a response to more
stringent capital regulation and has increased bank risk. This analysis
traces the growth ofsuch instruments primarily to the growth ofdirect-
finance markets in a setting ofincreased overall economic risk. It also
finds thatSLCs are atleastpotentially riskier than loans. Although banks
may be applying highercreditevaluation standards in partialcompensa-
tion, the issuance ofSLCsneverthelessmay warrantsomeform ofcapital-
related regulation.
The off balance sheet activities of commercial
banks have attracted a lotofattention lately. Regula-
tors, securities analysts and the financial press all
have voiced concerns about the rapid growth in such
contingent obligations as loan commitments, finan-
cial futures and options contracts, letters ofcredit,
and foreign exchange contracts. Although they are
not recognized as assets or liabilities on bank bal-
ance sheets (hence the term, "off balance sheet
activities," or OBS), these contingent claims
involve interest rate, credit, and/or liquidity risks.
Moreover, because they provide the opportunity for
substantially greater leverage than is the case for
banks' lending and investment activities, OBS have
the potential to increase banks' overall risk.
Ironically, bankregulators' efforts to control risk-
taking through more stringent capital regulation
may be partly responsible for the growth in OBS
over the last few years. Because regulatory defini-
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tions of capital adequacy currently do not include
OBS, banks may have an incentive to shift risk-
taking towards these relatively less-regulated
activities. To correct this problem, the federal bank
regulatory agencies are considering ways to factor
OBS exposure into their formal evaluation of a
bank's capital adequacy. Consequently, regulators
need to analyze the nature and degree of risk
involved in each type ofOBS as compared to banks'
otheractivities.
This article examines one off balance sheet
activity that has grown quite rapidly over the last
several years: standby letters of credit. The first
section discusses the uses for standby letters of
creditand the reasons for theirgrowth. Inthe second
section, a framework for analyzing the risks associ-
ated with standby letters of credit is developed.
Unfortunately, data limitations make impossible
any definitive statements about the impact of
standby letters ofcrediton overall bankrisk. Finally,
the paper concludes with some observations about
the regulatory treatment ofstandby letters ofcredit.I. The Market for Standby Letters of Credit
Of all the off balance sheet activities in which
U.S. banks engage, the issuance ofstandby letters
of credit (SLCs) has attracted the most attention
lately. Many observers point to the rapid growth in
SLCs outstanding over the last few years as well as
the prominent role such instruments played in sev-
eral recent bank failures - most notably, Penn
Square National Bank in 1982 - as evidence that
SLCs may be increasing bank risk significantly.
SLCs outstanding grew from $80.8 billion in June
1982 to $153.2 billion in June 1985 - a90percent
increase over the period. Moreover, most of that
growth occurred at the 25 largest banks, which
recorded more than a $40 billion increase in SLCs
outstanding.
A letter of credit (LC) is a contractual arrange-
ment involving three parties - the "issuer" (the
bank), the "account party" (the bank's customer)
and the "beneficiary." Typically, the account party
and the beneficiary have entered into a contract
requiring the former to make payment(s) orperform
some otherobligationto the latter. At the sametime,
the account party has contracted with its bank to
issue a letter ofcredit which, in effect, guarantees
thatby substitutingthe bank's liabilityfor that ofthe
account party, the account party will perform
according to the terms of the original contract with
the beneficiary. Initially, the bank's obligationunder
the LC is a contingent one because no funds are
advanced to the beneficiary until that party presents
the documents thatare stipulatedin the LC contract.
There are two types of LCs: the more traditional
commercial letter ofcredit which generally is used
to finance the shipment and storage of goods, and
the standby letter of credit which is being used in
connection with a growing variety of transactions,
including debt issuance and construction contracts.
Unlike the commercial LC, which is payable upon
presentation of title to the goods that have been
shipped, the SLC is payable only upon presentation
ofevidenceofdefaultornonperformance on the part
ofthe account party. As such, SLCs typically expire
unused, in contrast to commercial letters ofcredit.
Because SLCs are payable only upon nonperfor-
mance on the part of the account party, they are a
guarantee of either financial or economic perfor-
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mance onthe underlying contract. I The issuerofthe
SLC promises to advance funds to make the bene-
ficiarywhole in the event of the account party's
failure. to perform according to the terms of the
contract with the beneficiary. An SLC involving a
financial guarantee requires the issuing bank to pay
any principal or interest on debt owed the benefici-
ary by the account party should the latter default.
According to a recent survey, justover halfofbanks'
SLCs outstanding backs some form ofdebt obliga-
tion. 2 An SLC backing a construction contract, in
contrast, represents a performance guarantee and
requires the bank to make a payment to the benefici-
ary if the contractor does not complete the project
satisfactorily.
By issuing an SLC, the bank is assuming the risk
that normally would have been borne by the bene-
ficiary. However, itis the account party that arranges
the SLC and compensates the bank for the risk. In
return for paying the bank's fee and reducing the
beneficiary's risk, the account party expects to
obtain a higher price for the debt issued to or the
services performed for the beneficiary.
In general, the account party will choose to
arrange a standby letter ofcredit whenever the cost
ofthe transaction (thatis, the bank's fee) is less than
the value of the guarantee to the beneficiary (as
measured by the premium the beneficiary is willing
to pay for the account party's debt or services with
the SLC backing). The size of this differential
betweenthebank's fee and the beneficiary'swilling-
ness to pay for the guarantee depends upon two
factors.
First, the value ofthe guarantee to the beneficiary
will depend on the creditworthiness of the issuing
bank as compared to that of the account party and
the relative costs ofobtaining information about the
creditworthiness ofeach. An SLC issued by a bank
with a poor credit rating is not likely to be worth
much to the beneficiary since the probability ofthat
bank's default on its obligation may be high. Like-
wise, an SLC issued by a small, unknown bank may
have little value since the cost to the beneficiary of
obtaining information to evaluate the bank may be
greater than the cost ofevaluating the account party
and underwriting the risk itself.These observations are consistent with the data
presented in Tables I and 2, which show that most
SLC issuance occurs at the largest banks and that
the higher rated banks tend to do relatively more
SLC business.
Second, the size ofthe differential will depend on
the extent ofthe issuing bank's comparative advan-
tage in underwriting the risk ofdefault on the partof
the account party. (Ofcourse, the extenttowhichthe
bank's comparative advantage will be reflected in
the fees the bank charges depends on the level of
competition among issuers of SLCs). With respect
to most beneficiaries, the issuing bank's underwrit-
ing costs are likely to be substantially lowerbecause
thebankis betterableto diversify the risk associated
with SLCs and because the bank enjoys certain
economies in credit evaluation. For example, the
marginal cost of performing an evaluation of the
account party is lower for the bank than for the
beneficiary because the bank frequently has an
ongoing relationship with the account party; this
makes the costofobtaining information muchlower
for the bank.
TABLE 1




Year-End: 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 share)
Banks with Assets of Over $100 MM 34.1 45.7 69.9 98.3 117.4 144.3 153.2(100)
25 Largest Banks 27.2 36.5 55.5 77.6 91.5 111.2 117.9( 77)
10 Largest Banks 24.3 32.0 47.9 65.0 77.1 92.4 96.3 ( 63)
15 Other Large Banks 2.9 4.5 7.6 12.6 14.4 18.8 21.6( 14)
All Other Banks 6.9 9.2 14.4 20.7 25.9 33.1 35.3 ( 23)
Source: Quarterly Reports ofCondition
TABLE 2





Large Banks (with assets over $50 billion)
Aaa - Aa (4 banks)
A or less (1 bank)
Medium Banks (with assets of$10-50 billion)
Aaa - Aa (11 banks)
Aor less (8 banks)
Small Banks (with assets under $10 billion)
Aor less (1 bank)
*Ratings of banks based on latest evaluation in


















Standby Letters of Credit
of U.S. Commercial Banks
The Growth of SLCs
The almost exponential growth in SLCs outstan-
ding since the late 1970s (see Chart 1) is just one
manifestation of a rapidly growing general market
for guarantee-type products. In addition to the SLCs
thatbanksoffer, surety and insurance companies are
now offering such guarantees as credit-risk
coverages (which guarantee repayment ofprincipal
and interest on debt obligations) and asset-risk
coverages, such as residual value insurance and
systems performance guarantees. This expansion in
the types of coverages offered has given insurance
companies a rapidly growing source of premium
income. Between 1980 and 1984, the insurance
industry's net premiums from such surety opera-
tions3 nearly doubled, rising from $900 million to
$1.6 billion.4 Financial guarantees offered by other,
specialized providers have grown rapidly as well.
Municipal bond insurance, for example, was vir-
tual!y nonexistent prior to 1981, but now supports
an estimated 29 percent, or $6.4 billion, of new
issues oflong-term municipal bonds.s
Two factors account for this growth in the market
for financial guarantees in general, and SLCs in
particular. First, the growth over the last ten to 15
years of direct-finance markets has increased the
credit-riskexposureofinvestors who may prefernot
to bear such risk. Such direct-finance markets as the
commercial paper market have grown rapidly since
the late 1960s because borrowers are able to obtain
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mediaries such as banks. However, this decline in
financial intermediation has also meant that the
undiversified investors in such markets must bear
more credit risk than if they were to invest in the
deposit liabilities ofcommercialbanks. Apparently,
such an increase in credit-risk exposure is unpalat-
able to at least some portion of these investors
because 15 percentofall dealer-placed taxable com-
mercial paper is supported by some sort of legally
binding guarantee and nearly al! rated commercial
paper also is backed by a bank loan commitment.6
The second reason that financial guarantees have
grown rapidly over the last several years is that
overall economic risk has increased over the same
period. The rampant inflation ofthe late 1970s, the
increased volatility of interest rates and business
activity of the early 1980s, and the unexpected
sharp deceleration in the rate of inflation in the
middle 1980s have caused wide swings in asset
prices and returns on investment. Consequently, the
demand for instruments like SLCs and otherguaran-
tees that reduce the risk to the beneficiary has
increased tremendously.
Banks' involvement in this market is at once an
extension of their traditional lending business and,
because SLCs are not funded, a significant depar-
ture from it. Like their lending business, banks'
issuance ofSLCs entails the underwriting ofcredit
risk. In this area, banks enjoy certain economies of
specialization that make them lower-cost issuers of
financial guarantees. They can easily (that is, with-
out cost) diversitY the risk associated with SLCs.
Also, banks typically have other lending and
depositrelationships with theirSLC customers.As a
result, the marginal cost to banks of obtaining
information to perform a credit evaluation for the
purposes ofissuing an SLC is very low. Moreover, in
contrast to insurance companies, banks do not gen-
erally secure their guarantees with a formal collat-
eral arrangement with the account party since they
usually have the right to debit the account party's
deposit accounts. This lack of a formal collateral
arrangement makes banks' SLCs more attractive,
but it also increases the bank's risk somewhat. (See
the next section for a discussion of SLC risk.)
Given the enormous increase in the demand for
guarantees, the fact that banks are low-cost issuers
may be sufficientexplanationfor the rapid growth ofbank-issued SLCs over the last several years.
However, banks also may have an incentive to
respond to this demand since they can overcome
binding regulatory constraints on their lending
activities by doing so. Forexample, atcurrentlevels
of interest rates, reserve requirements add an esti-
mated 25 to 30 basis points to banks' cost offunds,
making bank creditconsiderably less attractive than
other sources of credit.7 Because SLCs a..'"e not
funded and are therefore unaffected by reserve
requirements, they represent a less costly way of
assuming a given level ofcredit risk.
A more important regulatory constraint that
undoubtedly has given banks incentive to issue
SLCs is the move towards tougher capital regulation
in recent years. Regulators began to express serious
concern about bank capital adequacy in the late
1970s as the aggregatecapital-to-assets ratio drifted
to historically low levels. Then, in December 1981,
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued
"Capital Adequacy Guidelines" to pressure large
banks into improving their capital-to-asset ratios.
More formal standards for large banks were
imposed in June 1983, and even more stringent
standards were imposed on the industry as a whole
in March 1985.
Economic theory suggests that the imposition of
tighter capital regulations depresses the return on
capital, causing a decline in the price of the regu-
lated firm's capital unless the firm can somehow
compensate either by reducing its asset base or by
increasing the riskiness of its portfolio. Because
nonbank competitors are not similarly regulated, a
moveto shrink assets will not necessarily increase
the return on bank capital. Thus, in the absence of
other forms of portfolio regulation, capital regula-
tion may induce banks to take on more risk.
Much of bank portfolio regulation is crafted to
prevent banks from responding to this incentive, but
regulators are concerned that banks' off balance
sheet activities may not be adequately covered. The
current capital adequacy standards do not formally
account for banks' offbalance sheet exposure. Con-
sequently, when faced with capital-related limita-
tions on asset growth, banks may have an incentive
to shift risk-taking toward SLCs and other offbal-
ance sheet activities that do not "use up" capital.
In sum, the growth in banks' SLC issuance is a
reflection ofan increaseddemand for financial guar-
antees both as result ofincreased reliance on direct-
finance as a source of funds and as a result of an
increase in overall risk. Banks have been willing to
respond to this demand by issuing SLCs because
they enjoy certain cost advantages in doing so and
because regulatory constraints on their lending
activities make the issuance of SLCs more attrac-
tive. The next section presents a framework for
analyzing the impactofSLCgrowth on bankrisk, as
well as an evaluation ofthe available evidence.
II. The Risk of Standby Letters of Credit
With the deregulation of many aspects of the
banking business, banks have received expanded
opportunities for risk-taking. Regulators worry that
increasingly riskybankpracticescould bankruptthe
deposit insurance system, which underwrites at
least a portion ofany increase inbank risk. Ifbanks
did not have deposit insurance or if that insurance
were pricedcorrectly, the costofbank liabilities and
the price of shareholder equity would fully reflect
any increase in bank risk. However, since all banks
currentlyare charged the same premium for deposit
insurance regardless of riskiness, and since bank
regulators apparently have been reluctant to close
large, troubled banks, at least large banks have an
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incentive to undertake more risk than theyotherwise
would.8
Consequently, bank regulators have attempted to
reduce banks' opportunities (if not incentives) for
risk-taking by adopting more stringent capital
requirements for the industry. However, because
such regulation may induce banks to try to take on
more risk, bank regulators worry that the rapid
growth in SLCs outstanding in recent years may be
increasingoverall bankrisk, particularlysince SLCs
now equal 100 percent of aggregate bank capital.
(See Chart 2.) Moreover, for the 25 largest banks,
theaverage ratioofSLCs tocapital is evenhigher-
165.4 percent. As a result, each ofthe three federalChart 2
Standby letters of Credit Outstanding
as a Percent of Capital
Virtually any financial instrument can be model-
led as an option or a series ofoptions. In this case,
because the borrower/account party can default on
its obligation to the bank, a loan and an SLC both
implicitly contain a put option on the assets of the
borrower/account party. In other words, the bor-
rower (or the account party) has the right to sell
("put") its assets to the bank at an exercise price
equal to the par value ofits obligation to the bank.
This option will be exercised ifthe par value ofthe
obligation exceeds the market value ofthe underly-
ing assets securing the obligation. 10
Several factors determine the risk ofexercise and
hence, the value of this option. First, the option's
value increases with increases in the exercise price,
other things equal. As the par value of the loan or
SLC obligation increases, so does the bank's risk.
Second, the value ofthis put option varies inversely
with the value ofthe underlying assets. As the value
of the underlying assets securing the obligation
falls, the cost of exercising the option also falls,
increasing the bank's risk. Finally, the option's value
rises with increases in the riskiness of those assets
(that is, variance of their price). The greater the
chance that the value of the underlying assets will
fall substantially, the greater is the risk to the
bank.II
A comparison of the risk associated with SLCs
and loans, then, requires an evaluation of all these
dimensions of the two portfolios. Moreover, an
evaluation of the impact of SLC risk on bank risk
also requires an understanding of the extent to
which the returns on the two portfolios are corre-
bankregulatory agencies (FRB, OCC and FDIC-
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) recently
proposed that the current capital adequacy regula-
tion be supplemented by risk-based capital
guidelines that would explicitly take into account
the relative riskiness of broad categories of bank
assets and certain offbalance sheet items, including
SLCS.9
Ideally, risk-based measures of capital adequacy
ought to reflect the effect ofa bank's SLC exposure
on overall risk, taking into account the extent to
which SLC risk is correlated with other risk
exposures. Unfortunately, sucha measure is difficult
to develop given currently available data and book-
value accounting conventions. Neithercan the mar-
kets for bank debt and equity provide more than an
approximation for this measure since the existence
ofdeposit insurance causes these markets to under-
price bank risk. As a result, bank regulators can
develop only crude measures ofSLC risk basedon a
comparison with the riskiness of banks' loan port-
folios.
Loans are the logical "benchmark" for rating the
riskiness ofSLCs because both instruments involve
creditrisk. Atthe sametime, however, acomparison
ofthe two is impeded by some ofthe differences in
their riskcharacteristics. Forexample, unlike loans,
SLCs generally do not entail interest rate risk and
liquidity risk. If the issuing bank must advance
funds under the terms of the SLC contract, the
interest rate on the resulting loan to the account
party typically varies with market rates (plus some
mark-up). Moreover, because SLCsgenerallydo not
require a commitment ofthe bank's funds, the risk
of loss associated with meeting related cash flow
obligations is very small. On the other hand,
because SLCs are not funded, they provide the
opportunity for a much higher degree of leverage
risk than is the case for loans.
An Options Framework
Options theory can be used to evaluatethe relative
riskiness ofloans and SLCs. However, because the
development of an econometric model to evaluate
these two instruments is beyond the scope of this
paper (and the available data), the discussion that
follows is intended only to suggest how this frame-








10 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1985lated. Unfortunately, dataon these aspects ofbanks'
SLC and loan portfolios are not available.
Nonetheless, it still is possible to use an options
framework at least to suggest how banks' SLC
issuance may be affecting bank risk. To do so,
assume that the characteristics of banks' loan and
SLC portfolios that are most under management
control are identical. In otherwords, for every given
SLC there is also a loan to the same customer with
the same term-to-maturity and parvalue. The essen-
tial difference between these two portfolios, then,
lies in the relative strength of their collateral
arrangements. The loans, for the most part, are
formally secured bythe borrowers' assets, while the
SLCs are not.
In an options framework, this difference amounts
to a difference in the relative costs ofexercising the
put options contained in the loan and SLC port-
folios. Because the cost of exercising the SLC-
related options is lower, other things equal, the
likelihood that they will be exercised is greater,
making the SLC portfolio riskier than the loan
portfolio. Moreover, this lower cost of exercise
means that the value of the SLC portfolio is more
sensitive to changes in the variance ofthe prices of
the underlying assets (that is, changes in the finan-
cial condition of the banks' customers). For this
reason as well, the SLC portfolio is riskier.
In practice, ofcourse, banks' SLC and loan port-
folios are not identical. Thus, while SLCs may be
riskier than loans in this one respect, banks proba-
bly manage the otheraspects ofthe two portfolios in
a manner that mitigates some of the greater risk
arising from differences in the contractual terms of
the loan and SLC instruments. Specifically, the
creditworthiness ofbanks' loan and SLC customers
may be very different. Bankers have indicated that,
as a matterofpolicy, they try to reject SLC business
from customers for whom default is even a remote
possibility. This is in admitted contrast to lending
policy, where the standards are somewhat more
relaxed. 12 (For a discussion of the other ways banks
nianage SLC risk, see the Appendix.)
Evidence
The rather limited data on fees and loss experi-
ence suggest that banks do, in fact, manage the risk
of the two portfolios differently. First, banks' SLC
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fees apparently are lower than the implicit fees they
charge on loans. The fees for SLCs for short-term,
high quality credits range from 25 to 50basis points
and from 125 to 150 basis points ormore for longer
term and/orlowerquality credits.BBycontrast,the
implicitloan premiumfor largedenomination, vari-
able rate loans is approximately240basis points for
both short- and longertermcredits. 14This disparity
in the fee structures of the two portfolios suggests
thatthe creditworthinessofbanks' SLCcustomers is
higher than that ofits loan customers.
This evidenceonthe relativeriskiness ofSLC and
loan portfolios should be interpreted cautiously,
however. Fees do not provide a measure of the
expected return on equity. After netting out the
higheradministrative andotherexpenses associated
with loans, it is likely that the expected return on
and the risk of SLCs is at least as high as that for
loans.
Similarly, the available evidenceonthe loss expe-
rience of loans and SLCs provides some evidence
that the creditworthiness of banks' loan and SLC
customers is different. Of course, loss experience
technicallydoes not measurecreditriskbecause it is
an ex post measure; however, there should be some
correlation over time between risk and observed
losses.
Data on SLC losses were last collected in 1978,
when a special survey on SLCs was conducted by
the staff of the Board of Governors. IS That survey
found that the initial default rate on SLCs averaged
2.03 percent. Butbecausemore than 98 percentwas
recovered, the loss rate on SLCs was extremely low
-only0.03 percent. This low figure comparesvery
favorably to banks' loan loss rate of0.16 percent in
1979. According to bankers in the Twelfth Federal
Reserve District, the loss rateonSLCshas increased
somewhat since then, but, compared to loan losses
now hovering around 0.65 percent, losses on SLCs
still are very low. 16 Once again, however, this evi-
dence should not be interpreted as proofthatthe risk
to bank capital from banks' SLC exposure is less
than that from loans.
Finally, evidence from capital markets may
provide some insights into the riskiness of banks'
SLC portfolios. Of course, this evidence may be
biased since prices will reflect the value ofany
perceived deposit insurance subsidy. Nonetheless,as long as investors believe that they are not fully
protected against loss, they will respond to per-
ceivedincreases inbank riskby demanding a higher
risk premium. Consequently, an evaluation of the
market'sreaction to the growth in SLCs outstanding
overtime shouldindicate whetherbankrisk also has
increased.
Inastudy ofthe determinants oflarge banks' CD
rates, Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies found that the
market had not penalized banks for increasing SLC
exposure between 1976 and early 1982. 17 Their
modelexplains the level ofthe CD rate as afunction
of the general level of interest rates and of various
bank risk characteristics. The effect ofbanks' SLC
exposure on CD rates is treated as having two
components: a leverage risk effect (the ratio ofbank
capital to risky assets, including loans and SLCs)
and a creditquality effect (the ratio ofSLCs to risky
assets- to allow for differences inthe creditquality
of the loan and SLC portfolios). Based on this
model, they found that CD rates rose with increas-
ing leverage and fell with increases in SLCs as a
proportion of total risky assets. Since these two
factors tended to cancel each other, the net effect on
bank risk of an increase in banks' SLC exposure
apParently was negligible.
Sllch a result is pe~haps not surprising for two
reasons. First, the level of SLCs outstanding was
low in relation to otherrisky assets and to capital for
mostofthisperiod. Thus, the effects ofrapid SLC
growth (in percentage terms) may have been
swamped by larger (absolute) increases in loan
volume. Second, the regression covers a period
when bank capital ratios generally were falling.
Because banks were not constrained by capital
regulation (at least not until the end ofthis period),
they may have had less incentive to increase overall
risk through SLC issuance. Moreover, it is signifi-
cant that Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies found that,
despite higher credit quality, increasing SLC
exposure did not reduce bank risk.
m. Regulating Standby letters of Credit
Bank regulators are concerned that the rapid
growth in SLCs outstanding over the last several
years is an indication that banks are attempting to
take on more risk, in part, as a result ofincreasingly
stringent capital regulation. This paper has sug-
gestedthat while capital regulation may have played
a modest role in the growth of SLCs, the primary
reason for such growth has been an increase in the
demand for financial guarantees generally. Whether
this growth has increased bank risk is still open to
question.
In some repects, SLCs are (potentially at least)
more risky than loans, but the available evidence
suggests that banks may be applying higher credit
evaluation standards for SLCs than for loans to
compensate for the riskier features of the SLC
instrument. At the same time, however, this paper
has suggested that it would be a mistake to infer
from this evidence that SLCs necessarily pose less
riskto capitalthan do loans. Itis hard to believe that
with the implicit subsidy to risk-taking provided by
the deposit insurance system, banks actually would
conducttheir SLC business in a manner that entails
less risk than lending.
26
Currently, bank regulators place only rather lim-
ited restrictions on banks' SLC activities. They
require only that banks (l) include SLCs with loans
for the purposes of calculating loan concentrations
to any one borrower (the limit is 10 percent of
capital) and (2) apply the same credit evaluation
standards for SLCs as for loans. However, because
of the greater riskiness of the SLC instrument as
well as the greaterpotential for capital leverage with
SLCs than with loans, some form ofcapital-related
regulation ofSLCs may be justified.
Capital adequacy regulation with respect to SLC
exposure ought to do two things. First, from a
bookkeeping perspective, it should ensure that
institutionsthatare likely to experience largerlosses
also have a larger capital buffer to absorb those
losses. Second, ideally, it should provide a structure
thatpenalizes banks for attempting to increase over-
all risk through increases in SLC risk or leverage.
Accordingly, onecanevaluate the risk-based cap-
ital adequacy concept that is under consideration at
the federal bank regulatory agencies. Under this
approach, SLCs outstanding would be added to
assets for the purpose of calculating a new, risk-based capital ratio. Moreover, because it is thought
that at least certain types of SLCs may entail less
risk than loans, those SLCs would be accorded a
lower weight in the calculation of that ratio. For
eX,imj;lle, the FRB's proposed guidelines assign a
weight of1.0to most types ofSLCs, but aweightof
only0.6to afew types, such as performance-related
SLCs.
The advantage ofthis basic·approach is that it is
easy to administer. Also, it provides a means of
ensuring that as banks' SLC exposure grows, so too
will their capital buffer. The disadvantage is that it
treats all SLC portfolios (and all loan portfolios, for
that matter) as having the same level ofcredit risk.
Clearly, this approach will impose a higher capital
cost on the banks that have higher quality SLC
portfolios than is the case for banks with lower
quality portfolios. As a result, the former may have
an incentive to compensate for this implicit penalty
bytaking on morecreditrisk in theirSLC portfolios.
To overcome this problem, the regulators could,
in theory, adopt a more sophisticated measure of
SLC risk along the lines of the options model
outlined inthis paper. Sucha measure would enable
regulators to take variations inthe creditquality of
individual portfolios into account when assigning
risk weights. However, it would be difficult to
administer since considerably more data on the
characteristics of individual portfolios would be
needed. Instead, the regulators have chosen simply
to recognize the inherent weaknesses in any capital
adequacy ratio and to emphasize that such ratios -
even those that attempt to adjust for risk - are
meant only to supplement the bank examiner's
judgement. Ultimately, they argue, the bank exam-
iner must decide whether an institution's capital is
adequate based on such qualitative considerations
as the quality of earnings and management and
overall asset quality as measured by the level and
severity ofexaminer-classified assets.
ApPENDIX
Banks seek to manage SLC risk in several ways.
first, throug/l the fees they charge, banks require
compensation in proportion to the risks they
assume. Consequently, SLC fees vary with the term
ofthe SLC and the credit rating ofthe account party.
For short-term, high-quality credits, fees currently
range from 25 to 50 basis points on the outstanding
amount, while fees on longerterm and lowerquality
credits range from 125 to 150 basis points ormore.
Second, banks attempt to reduce credit risk on
longer term commitments by requiring periodic
(usually annual) renegotiation of the terms of the
agreement. For example, SLCs backing the com-
mercial paper ofnuclear fuel trusts typically have a
three-to four-year term, but are renewable each year
atthe bank's option. This arrangement helps protect
the bank against deterioration in the credit-
worthiness ofthe account party over the term ofthe
SLC.
However, such arrangements are not always ade~
quate. One large bank that issues SLCs to back
industrial development bonds analyzes its risk
exposure in terms ofthelife ofthe bonds (usually 20
years). Ithas chosen this measure instead ofthe life
of the SLC (typically five years) because at the
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expiration ofthe SLC, ifthe account party's finan-
cial condition has deteriorated such that it cannot
obtain another SLC, the bondholders can declare
the borrower in default under the terms ofthe bond
identure and thus require the bank to cover any
losses.* In this case, the shorter term of the SLC
does not necessarily limit the bank'sexposure. Like-
wise, a bank may be liable for the repayment of
commercial paperdebt ifit is unwilling to renew its
SLC since the bank's unwillingness most likely
would result in the account party's inability to
refund its debt.
Third, although SLCs frequently are unsecured,
the terms of the bank's contract with the account
party provide another measure ofprotection against
loss. Typically, the bank's agreement with the
account party stipulates that the bank may: 1)
require the account party to deposit funds to cover
any anticipated disbursements the bank mustmake
under the SLC, 2) debit the account party's account
to cover disbursements, 3) call for collateral during
thetermofthe SLC, and 4) book any unreimbursed
balance as a loan at an interest rate and on terms set
by the bank.** In the event of the account party's
bankruptcy, such conditions, ofcourse, do not pro-tect the bank against loss in the same way that a
fonnal collateral agreement would. Under most
circumstances, however, they do provide sufficient
incentive for the accountparty to satisfy theterms of
the ul1derlying contract.
A fourth way that banks can manage the credit
risk involved in SLC issuance is through portfolio
diversification. (This approach, of course, cannot
reduce systematic risk.) Banks that specialize in
issuing certain types of SLCs - backing commer-
cial paperissuedby nuclearfuel trusts, for example
- stillcandiversifyby buying and sellingparticipa-
tions inSLCs. Bysellingaparticipationinan SLCit
has issued, a bank in effect reinsures some of the
risk. Ifpaymentmustbemade tothe beneficiary and
the account partyis unable to make reimbursement,
the issuing bank and the bankthat purchaseda share
ofthe SLCwillshare in theresulting losses. Undera
participation arrangement, the issuing bank will be
liable for the full amount of the SLC only if the
participating bank were to fail. Participations of
SLCs accounted for 11 percentofthe $149.2billion
in SLCs outstanding as ofMarch 1985.
Finally, in response to growing regulatory con-
cernoverbanks' SLCexposure, banksare beginning
to manage risk by placing limitations on SLC
growth. A number of large banks have established
sOmemultiple ofcapital (for example, 150 percent)
as alimiton the amount oftheir SLCs outstanding.
Inaddition to administratively imposed limitations,
the commercial paper market tends to limit SLC
growth as well. Since SLC-backed commercial
paper trades as an obligation of the SLC issuer,
excessive SLC issuance will reduce the value ofthe
issuing hank's guarantee as well as the price of its
own.commercial paper.
* Based on information from an informal survey of
large banks in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District
conducted in August 1985.
**See Lloyd-Davies' article on standby letters of
credit in Below the Bottom Line, a staffstudy ofthe
Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve System,
January 1982, for a more detailed discussion ofthe
contractual terms ofthe LC agreement.
FOOTNOTES
1. Historically, banking laws have prohibited banks from
offering financial and performance guarantees in order to
preserve the traditional separation between banking and
commerce in this country. Standby letters of credit (and
commercial letters of credit, for that matter) are not tech-
nically guarantees, however, since the issuing bank's obli-
gation under an SLC is to advance funds upon presenta-
tion of certain documents regardless of whether the
underlying contract between the beneficiary and the
account party has been performed to both parties' satis-
faction.
2. Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey conducted by the
Federal Reserve System in August 1985.
3. Insurers traditionally have issued surety bonds which
are, technically, performance guarantees. Lately, they
have become active issuers of financial guarantees. Reve-
nue from these two lines of business are reported together
as revenues from surety operations.
4. Eric Gelman, et ai, "Insurance: Now It's a Risky Busi-
ness," Newsweek, November 4, 1985.
5. Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, August 1985.
6. Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, August 1985.
7. This estimate is based on the opportunity cost, at
current interest rates, of the 3 percent marginal reserve
requirement on large CDs.
8. Fora more detailed discussion of the deposit insurance
system and the risk-taking incentives it creates, please see
the articles by Barbara Bennett and David Pyle in the
Spring 1984 issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco's Economic Review.
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9. The Federal Reserve Board's proposed rules on risk-
based capital guidelineswere set forth in Federal Register,
January 31, 1986, p. 3976. The comment period for this
proposal extends until April 25, 1986.
10. For unsecured debtand SLCs, the relevant priceis the
value of the bank's prorated share of the firm's assets in a
bankruptcy proceeding.
11. Black and Scholes have shown that an option's value
is determined bythe riskiness of the underlying asset (that
is, variance of return on the asset), the option's term to
maturity, and the level of the risk-free interest rate, as well
as the level of the exercise price and the market value of
the underlying asset.
12. Based on information from an informal survey of large
banks in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District conducted in
August 1985.
13. Ibid.
14. Survey of Terms of Lending at Commercial Banks,
May 1985, conducted by the Federal Reserve System.
15. Peter Lloyd-Davies, "Survey of Standby Letters of
Credit," Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1979, pp.
716-719.
16. August 1985 survey of large 12th District banks.
17. Michael Goldberg and Peter Lloyd-Davies, "Standby
Letters of Credit: Are Banks Overextending Themselves?,"
Journal ofBank Research, Spring 1985, pp. 28-39REFERENCES
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